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Abstract 
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) form a central building block within the prevailing 
Evidence Based Mental Health (EBMH) paradigm. Both methodology and paradigm have 
been widely problematized since their emergence in the mid-late twentieth century. We draw 
on the concept of ‘strategic ignorance’ to understand why the paradigm still prevails. We 
present focus group data gathered from 37 participants (service users, public, carers, GPs, 
commissioners) concerning the way they made sense of an RCT of psychotherapy for 
treatment resistant depression. Thematic analysis of the findings revealed an overall critique 
of RCT methods which we refer to as ‘non-strategic ignorance’. Specifically, participants 
problematized the construct of depression, unseating the premise of the RCT; they were 
sceptical about the purpose and highlighted its failure to show how therapy works or who 
might benefit; the RCT was seen as inadequate for informing decisions about how to select a 
therapy. Participants assumed the treatment would be cost effective given the client group 
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and nature of the therapy, irrespective of any RCT findings. Each area of lay (‘non-strategic’) 
critique has an analogous form within the methodological expert domain. We argue that 
‘expert’ critiques have generally failed to have paradigmatic impact because they represent 
strategic ignorance. Yet parallel non-strategic critiques have common sense appeal, 
highlighting the potential power of lay voices. The discussion considers whether the EBMH 
paradigm is faced with epistemological problems of such complexity that the conditions exist 
for a new paradigm in which service user views are central and RCTs peripheral.  
 
Keywords: RCTs; depression; psychoanalytic psychotherapy; patient and public 
involvement; evidence based mental health  
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Introduction 
This article presents a paradigmatic critique of Evidence Based Mental Health (EBMH), 
specifically its veneration of Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs). Yet, rather than review 
the many expert methodological critiques abundant in existing literature, the thoughts of non-
researchers (service users, carers, members of the public, GPs and commissioners) were 
sought, specifically in response to a recent RCT of psychoanalytic psychotherapy for 
treatment resistant depression. First, we consider the historical background to EBMH using 
the concept of ‘strategic ignorance’ as a lens through which to understand its persistence in 
face of widespread epistemological critique. We then present empirical data to highlight the 
potential strength of a paradigm critique derived from an alternative position of ‘non-strategic 
ignorance’, which has common sense appeal. The analysis of this data provides a forerunner 
to a discussion, using Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolutions, on whether the paradigm 
could shift towards one in which service users are central, rather than an epistemological 
problem to be solved. 
A Brief History of EBMH 
The concepts incorporated within Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) are generally attributed 
to Bradford-Hill, a British statistician involved in the first RCT in 1948; Cochrane, a British 
doctor who wrote a pamphlet on clinical effectiveness in 1972; and Sackett, a Canadian 
doctor who coined the term EBM in the 1970s (Devereaux & Yusuf, 2003).  Healthcare 
reforms in the UK enhancing the paradigmatic status of EBM spanned Conservative and 
Labour governments: ‘Working for Patients’ (1989), ‘Promoting Clinical Effectiveness’ 
(1996), ‘A First Class Service’ (1998), ‘The NHS Plan’ (2000) and guidelines produced by 
the National Institute of Clinical Effectiveness (NICE) from 1998 onwards.  Similar reforms 
occurred in the USA and Canada over the same period.   
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EBMH followed suit from the 1950s, hand-in-hand with psychotropic drug research. EBMH 
rose to paradigm status around the late 1990s when SSRIs dominated the anti-depressant 
market. According to Rees, past-president of the UK Royal College of Psychiatrists, the 
pharmaceutical industry learned RCT methods from psychiatry and adopted them to get new 
drugs passed by the Committee for Safety of Drugs (Rees & Healey, 1997).   
 
The political agenda central to EBMH was evident in early accounts of its development by its 
proponents. Paris (2000) drew a direct contrast between EBMH and psychoanalysis, 
describing 1950s and 1960s psychiatry as dominated by psychoanalysis, opinion and 
authority which he pejoratively termed ‘archaic’.  Paris praised the shift in types of articles 
published in the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry between 1950 and 2000, which moved from 
‘clinical inference’ to EBMH, depicting EBMH as an advancement of science and a rational, 
logical step in psychiatry.  This celebratory tone among early proponents fits with Wieringa 
et al’s (2017) account of EBM as a modernist movement, ‘able to provide “facts” of biology 
and epidemiology, as far as possible devoid of human intuition or experience’. Paris set out 
psychopharmacology and genetics as developments of reason and logic, bringing psychiatry 
to be equal with other medical specialties. Similarly, Joyce (2002) invoked Popper to 
construct EBMH as a powerful philosophical tool for the advancement of psychiatry.   
 
Nevertheless, early critics were acutely aware of the permissive influence of the 
pharmaceutical industry on the development of evidence and knowledge and on clinical and 
academic freedom and enterprise.   Harari (2001) noted that EBMH was based on 
empiricism, the notion that knowledge can be built by making observations of the world and 
organising observations into theories.  Harari traced the history of the philosophy of science 
through Husserl’s phenomenology, Galileo’s observations of gravity and Einstein’s 
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epistemological concerns to illustrate that observations in any field of enquiry cannot be 
neutral nor direct the observer to the truth because of the many theories the observer may 
already assume to be true before making the observation.  An empiricist EBMH was 
therefore a threat to ‘epistemic pluralism’ in psychiatry.   
 
Specifically critiquing RCTs, Healy (1999) argued that they formed part of a ‘sanctioned 
narrative’ employed by psychiatry to evaluate and promote pharmacotherapy, forcing 
psychotherapies to adopt the same evaluative methods.  He challenged the autocracy of this 
narrative arguing that clinical trials in mental health used ‘suspect’ observer rating scales and 
convenience samples for marketing needs.  Dixon and Goldmann (2004) noted loss of 
‘fidelity’ as intervention programmes began to drift away from the original trial model and 
varied outcomes began to emerge, highlighting the question of whether it is possible to 
implement treatments in real clinical practice that RCTs have found to be effective.   
 
These and other critiques have been rehearsed many times in many fora since. The paradigm 
has been debunked from a range of disciplinary perspectives including anthropology 
(Kleinman, 1995) and philosophy (Devish & Murray, 2009).  Yet RCTs remain central to 
EBMH and the same serious concerns continue to be raised today. Shedler (2017), for 
example, describes new American Psychiatric Association trauma guidelines as ‘harmful’ 
and ‘unethical’ because of their reliance on RCTs. He notes: 
Copernicus, Galileo, Darwin, Einstein, Niels Bohr, Marie Curie, Stephen Hawking. 
What do they have in common? None of them ever conducted an RCT. Most scientific 
knowledge does not come from RCTs. 
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Strategic Ignorance in EBMH 
We now consider the concept ‘strategic ignorance’ to understand the persistence of EBMH in 
the face of enduring critiques. Informing the development of a sociology of ignorance, 
McGoey (2010) analysed the debates which emerged when Kirsch (2008) published a meta-
analysis of antidepressant trials following freedom of information requests to pharmaceutical 
companies. This could have been a watershed moment for EBMH, yet McGoey proposed that 
the arguments problematizing RCTs only served to reify EBMH because of a widespread 
investment in ‘strategic ignorance’. 
Partly because of the regulatory and clinical dependence on RCTs, problems within 
individual RCTs are rarely seen as indictments of the methodology as a whole: 
instead, they are used as evidence of the need to reﬁne and perfect the methodology 
further (McGoey, 2010). 
 
McGoey hones in on Kirsch’s conclusion that the summed effect of antidepressants has a 
Cohen’s d of 0.32, below NICE’s threshold of 0.5, itself an arbitrary marker. She points out 
that in using an argument derived from EBMH principles in order to unseat pharmaceutical 
claims, Kirsch further reifies the paradigm and its principles. 
It is the very methodological weaknesses of RCTs that imbues them with the authority 
they hold: for to deny the reliability of a particular study, one must reach for more 
data, more studies, larger RCTs, in order to justify the validity of one’s objections. Of 
course, individuals are free to suggest that RCTs themselves are incapable of 
arbitrating in the debate before them. But what data do they possess, what 
representation, what visuals, what inscriptions… does such a dissenter have at hand 
to convince others of the value of her or his interpretation over others’? The problem 
is not that individuals are incapable of or restrained from challenging RCTs, but that, 
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unless they have the resources to defend the scientiﬁc rigour of their objections, 
preferably through RCT evidence, their interlocutors are equally free to remain deaf. 
(McGoey, 2010) 
 
Strategic ignorance is the behaviour of key players in which they are aware of 
epistemological flaws and yet, in order to make their case and appear authoritative, they must 
also appear ignorant of those flaws. McGoey (2010) concludes that the paradox within 
EBMH is that “never before have the inadequacies of RCTs been so apparent to so many. 
Yet, equally, never before have those in positions of authority – from regulators, to NICE 
policy-makers, to doctors – relied so extensively on RCT evidence”. 
 
 ‘New’ EBM 
It has been suggested by recent commentators that the EBM paradigm is changing. Wieringa 
et al (2017) drew on Latour to suggest that EBM is evolving beyond its ‘modernist’ roots to 
embrace Latour’s ‘middle kingdom’. They suggest that, rather than dichotomising nature and 
culture, EBM now acknowledges the ‘hybridisation’ of nature and culture. They claim this 
results in more pluralism and less hierarchy in research methodology; that evidence is treated 
as subjective, requiring interpretation dependent on culture and context; that individual 
clinical decisions take individual context into account rather than reifying aggregate 
evidence; that healthcare can be inference based, recognising the limits of scientific evidence. 
Wieringa et al (2017) find the proof of this ‘evolution’ in the ALLtrials campaign which 
promotes full disclosure of trial results, preventing selective publication; apps facilitating 
individualised clinical decision making, taking into account patient views and affordability; 
and increasing acceptance of other forms of evidence such as pragmatic RCTs.  
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However, Latour’s thesis on nature and culture went beyond the concept of ‘hybridisation’ 
referred to by Wieringa et al (2017). Latour proposed a stance of ‘symmetrical anthropology’ 
or ‘relative relativism’, which recognises the symmetry of nature and culture in constructing 
individuals. He proposed that ‘nature-cultures’ can be studied, differences recognised, 
measured and explained; that the relationship between nature and culture is essential to 
understanding the relationships between nature-cultures and the former relationship acts as a 
measuring instrument for the latter. 
 
By considering EBM as a form of nature-culture that we can study; and taking the claims of 
Wieringa et al (2017) that a ‘new EBM’ is emerging; it might be argued that a persistent 
feature of EBM as a nature-culture is its tendency to cultivate strategic ignorance. We suggest 
that ‘new EBM’ is a fallacy and that EBMH remains replete with epistemological problems 
which cannot be solved through ‘evolution’. 
 
Lay Perspectives of an RCT 
Experts will likely continue to critique RCTs from a position of strategic ignorance while 
proponents may continue to claim the methodology is evolving to address these problems. 
We consider RCTs from a different perspective and explore how a non-psychotherapy 
research audience understands the design, purpose and findings of an RCT of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy for treatment resistant depression (Fonagy et al, 2015). Psychotherapy 
researchers have rehearsed the problematisation of RCTs as diligently as others (e.g. 
Richardson, 2000). Thus, the very undertaking of an RCT (which the current authors were 
involved in as researchers) might be seen as a form of strategic ignorance, fully embracing a 
methodology known to be flawed.  
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The RCT was designed by Richardson in consultation with clinical and research colleagues to 
meet the criteria NICE would apply in developing guidelines for depression. This was 
achieved in spite of the many contradictions in terms of the nature of the treatment and the 
intended outcomes of psychoanalytic psychotherapy which are broadly more relational than 
symptom based. It being necessary to target and define a diagnostic group for study purposes, 
the category ‘treatment resistant depression’ was selected with comorbidity and complexity 
screened in (see Taylor et al, 2012) because of the importance of demonstrating cost as well 
as clinical effectiveness of a treatment widely considered to be expensive (Richardson & 
Hobson, 2000).  
 
In the present study, we set out to explore the ways in which service users, members of the 
public, carers, GPs and other non-psychotherapy researchers would understand and make 
sense of this RCT. The aim was to explore how RCTs are understood from without the 
paradigm, from where it may be possible to consider the method and findings without relying 
on EBMH methodological expertise or investing in ‘strategic ignorance’. 
 
Methods 
Two research engagement events were held in London, January 2017. The events were 
advertised through social media, directed at a range of service user and carer groups, GPs and 
mental health commissioners in and around London. A weblink was provided on the flyer for 
people to register for the event. The registration process included ticking consent statements 
to indicate understanding that the event would involve taking part in focus groups which 
would be recorded and that data would be anonymised, stored securely and analysed for 
research purposes. In total 37 people took part (3 GPs, 17 service users, 6 members of the 
public, 4 carers, 1 commissioner, 6 non-researcher mental health professionals).  Ethics 
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approval was obtained from the University of Essex Faculty of Science and Health Ethics 
Committee (Ref 16004). 
 
The events began with a one-hour presentation in four parts. First, the RCT design and 
findings were presented using slides to convey the material in lay terms, explaining terms 
such as ‘control group’ and ‘randomised controlled trial’. An accompanying leaflet 
containing the same information was provided to all participants on the day 
(https://ris.essex.ac.uk/repository.html?pub=111822). Next, two service users spoke about 
their experiences of receiving psychodynamic psychotherapy for depression. Thirdly, a GP 
who had referred patients to the RCT spoke about the impact of therapy on the patients she 
referred. In the final part, a therapist who had delivered therapy within the RCT spoke about 
her work with one patient and her perception of how the therapy impacted on the patient. 
 
After the presentations, participants were divided into focus groups. There were six groups 
across the two events ranging from 3-8 participants. Four groups were made up of service 
users, members of the public and carers; two groups were made up of GPs, commissioners 
and other health professionals. 
 
At the start of each focus group, participants were reminded of the consent and 
confidentiality statements they had checked when registering and advised that they were free 
to leave if they no longer wanted to take part. No participants withdrew. Each group had two 
facilitators who encouraged the group to discuss four topics: initial reactions to the 
presentations; thoughts on the methodology; whether the presentations would influence them 
in any way; what further research would be useful. Focus groups were audio-recorded, 
transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
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Findings 
Five overall themes emerged, each with subthemes indicated in italics (see Table 1). 
Quotations from participants are identified in terms of whether the participant was in one of 
the ‘Professional’ focus groups (GPs, commissioners, other professionals); or in one of the 
patient, public or carer (‘PPC’) focus groups. Overall, the findings represented a broad 
critique of the RCT from a non-strategic perspective, partially blind to its venerated status in 
the expert domain. Since participants were mostly non-experts in psychological treatment 
trial methodology, this overarching finding is referred to as ‘non-strategic ignorance’. The 
analysis has also highlighted where these critiques have a parallel form in the expert 
methodological domain, hence noting where ‘strategic ignorance’ and ‘non-strategic 
ignorance’ are partly analogous. 
 
Table 1: Themes and subthemes 
Problematising depression Trauma underlies mental illness 
Trauma is unlocked by psychotherapy 
Depression is an inevitable response to trauma 
Who cares about RCTs? RCTs cannot capture the complexity of effect in 
psychotherapy 
Individual ratings on scales are unreliable 
Completing questionnaires is harmful 
Who will benefit? 
Why doesn’t therapy work for some people? 
Wariness of universal claims 
Bowing to the audience on study design 
Service user experiences influence funding decisions 
Commissioning processes are based on headline messages 
RCT will not increase access to therapy 
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Understanding how therapy 
works 
 
Short term therapies unlikely to lead to real recovery 
Relationship with the therapist key to the process 
Psychoanalytic therapy provides longer term learning and 
skills 
Unmasking the process 
Therapist and GP need to work together 
Ending therapy needs transitional support 
Selecting a therapy is 
complex 
 
Therapy should be tailored not manualised 
Therapy duration should depend on individual need 
You have to find what’s best for you 
Therapy should not be based on profiling or a formal diagnosis 
Hearing other's experiences of therapy is important for one’s 
own choice 
Choice is unsupported by medical professionals 
Overcoming stigma comes before choice 
Inevitability of cost 
effectiveness 
Intuitively holistic sense of the broader value of the therapy  
Patients are not burdens 
 
 
Problematising depression 
The RCT in question was constructed as a trial for ‘treatment resistant depression’. This label 
was problematised by participants and seemed intrinsic to participants’ determining the value 
of the RCT. In this theme, the construct of ‘treatment resistant depression’ was challenged by 
both PPC and professional groups, indicating an inherent problem with framing an RCT 
around a single label and defining it through inclusion and exclusion criteria. The disease 
category label selected was also felt to infer a biological disease inhabiting a patient who is 
somehow unbending or resistant to the proper medical cure, which is fundamentally different 
conceptually to participants’ idea of depression as a natural response to past or current 
trauma. The theme illustrates how participants’ common sense non-medicalized concept of 
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depression undermined the core tenets of the RCT. In this sense, participants, through 
speaking to their experience, have alighted on a parallel expert critique of the medicalization 
of mental illness (e.g. Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011), which overlaps with expert 
critiques of EBMH at a foundational level of defining the ‘diseases’ around which ‘evidence’ 
is framed. 
 
There was a widespread assumption underlying participant comments that trauma underlies 
mental illness and that the client group that participated would have had high levels of trauma 
which could be unlocked by psychotherapy: 
 
…quite a lot of what I think emerges from this… long term psychotherapy is actually 
quite a lot of people realising that they’ve hung on to something very traumatic. 
(Professional) 
 
Connected to this was the understanding of depression as an inevitable response to current 
trauma: 
 
…if you’ve got severe arthritis and you can’t move and you never go and you never 
see anyone, how the hell you are supposed to not be depressed I do not know, ‘cause 
your life is hell and my mother was like that and your life is just misery, you’re just 
lying there and you never see anyone, plonked in front of the television, you can’t 
move and you’ve had all of these operations I mean, how can you expect someone 
like that to not be depressed. (PPC) 
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Along with advocating a trauma model, there was a general rejection of the medical model of 
depression: 
 
…the chemical imbalance theory [ ] of depression is a totally unproven theory…that 
psychiatrists have been trying to say it’s proven for donkey’s years. (PPC) 
 
There was an assumption, mainly among professionals, that the client group described had 
personality difficulties which would impact on the usefulness of therapy:  
 
…quite a few of these people are going to have quite complex personalities as well 
so… I just think a sense of carefully selected people I think a bit longer would be my 
suggestion. (Professional) 
 
These assumptions about the nature of the population raise questions about the validity of a 
single diagnosis approach employed in RCTs and NICE guidelines, highlighting the potential 
for manipulation and/or distortion where there is comorbidity in RCT populations. The 
possibility of labelling the RCT as a trial for personality disorder treatment was raised and 
dismissed by participants because of the stigmatising effect of that label; but there was a 
sense expressed by PPC participants that the term ‘treatment resistant depression’ was 
stigmatising even without invoking the personality label, perhaps because the implication was 
there anyway: 
 
People that don’t benefit from an inverted commas treatment, whether drug or therapy 
because there’s something not working about the treatment, it’s not in the person that 
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they’re resistant, it’s just that they’re not being helped as much or in the way they 
need or as well as they need it, so I don’t like the term treatment resistant. (PPC) 
 
 
Who cares about RCTs? 
In this theme, participants appeared  ‘ignorant’ of the status of RCTs in EBMH, rejecting any 
veneration of RCTs not for any technical paucity in the conduct or design of this particular 
trial, but from a confidently common sense notion of what type of information is meaningful. 
This is congruent with expert critiques drawing on issues around the complexity of process in 
psychotherapy which renders RCT methodologies unsuitable because they over-generalise 
interventions. 
 
While commenting on the apparent quality of the RCT and positive findings (significant 
treatment effects at 2-year follow-up), participants seemed sceptical about its relevance. In a 
broad sense, some of this was about the way in which the RCT over-simplified issues. For 
example, there was an idea that the methods used can’t capture the complexity of the effect of 
psychotherapy: 
 
I suppose that’s the problem I have with statistics because I don’t think you can really 
capture… you feel better but I mean… you might be having one panic attack a week 
instead of once a month or something. (PPC) 
 
This was coupled with more specific criticisms of the use of questionnaires for measurement 
both generally and specifically because individual ratings on measures are unreliable: 
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I've done the BDI stuff… they give it to you before crisis after crisis to see… how 
much you've gotten better, before therapy, after therapy… it also depends on how you 
feel on that day at that particular hour, so for example you've just broken up with your 
boyfriend, of course you're gonna say yes life is miserable…  I just think that when 
you're really, really depressed the last thing you want to do is fill in questionnaires, so 
I don't think they're wholly accurate. (PPC) 
  
There were some particularly strong views, taking this further, that completing questionnaires 
is harmful for service users: 
 
…that questionnaire is just the most depressing thing… I started reading that, 
someone gave me that and I felt like shit… I mean, do you feel miserable, blah, blah 
do you want to kill yourself and… I get to about half way through it and I cannot bear 
to complete it. (PPC) 
 
In this and other comments, there is a sense that the technical inaccuracy of measures goes 
hand-in-hand with the moral problem of asking service users to complete forms at times of 
distress; and that these flaws cannot be uncoupled. 
 
Related to concerns with measurement were more general concerns that the controlled design 
is not adequate to account for processes: 
 
…how we know or how we cannot review or establish … improvement in treatment is 
due to the psychotherapy itself, to the psychotherapy variables, to their interactions, 
with their relationship with the psychotherapist all the techniques… I’m not sure that, 
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even if the RCT is considered the gold standard for effectiveness of treatment, we can 
easily establish that and pin point exactly the variable the elements that make that 
different psychoanalytic treatment versus treatment… (PPC) 
 
Whilst psychotherapy researchers might similarly argue that process research is necessary to 
accompany outcome research to help understand which techniques work and why, there is a 
slightly different nuance here in that knowing whether this specific treatment is helpful 
cannot be determined by the RCT because the RCT can’t explain how it helps. This is 
discussed further below in relation to the main theme Understanding how therapy works. 
 
Other reasons for being sceptical about the findings were that it could not reveal who might 
benefit or why therapy didn’t work for some people. These concerns suggest that the RCT 
method was perceived as too blunt to provide useful information, relegating the fundamental 
tenet of RCTs to find out if on a group aggregate level an intervention has broadly better 
outcomes than a control intervention. 
 
…it would be really good if we knew more about who was … more likely to benefit, 
because that’s obviously the commissioners’ question, but that’s a service user’s 
question as well, they don’t really want to go through something and feeling you 
haven’t benefited. (PPC) 
 
This wariness of universal claims derived from RCTs also emerged from the Professional 
focus groups, albeit expressed using more technical language: 
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…if you look at the efficacy results of effectiveness then… the effect sizes are not 
brilliant really and they’re not good for antidepressants… they’re a bit better for CBT, 
but we haven’t really got there… I don’t think psychoanalytic psychotherapy is the 
holy grail either… one size does not fit all. (Professional) 
 
Conscious of these flaws, there were a number of ways in which participants suggested that 
conducting the RCT was simply bowing to the audience on study design: 
 
…it’s as if you’ve been forced to use them because you are competing for resources 
with other kinds of mental health care so you have to… adopt an internationally 
recognised method. (PPC) 
 
One participant felt particularly strongly about this, suggesting that the host Trust had 
adopted a ‘pseudoscientific’ approach for political purposes. This is very similar to the 
concept of ‘strategic ignorance’, but for the participants concerned this seemed to border on 
undermining the value of the psychoanalytic approach entirely, indicating a different 
internalised paradigm for conceptualising ‘science’. 
 
This alternative view of scientific value was also tangible in the professional focus groups in 
which emerged a consistent view that service user experiences are influential in funding 
decisions: 
 
…numbers are not enough, I think there needs to be that narrative that goes with it, 
that personal experience I think is very, very important actually. (Professional) 
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In contrast to EBMH doctrine, professionals also indicated that the local commissioning 
processes are based on headline messages in what seems to be the antithesis of a systematic 
rigorous process: 
I have been involved in helping [the CCG] when they do, you know, proposals, calls 
for bids, and you often have people who are not specialist in the area at all, possibly 
not even mental health trained…just trawling through …the literature just to see what 
they can come up with so, the clearer you can be with your messages in different 
places the more likely you are to catch the eye of the commissioners. (Professional) 
 
In parallel was an assumption across all groups that the RCT was almost irrelevant in terms 
of commissioning because it would inevitably not increase availability of this type of 
therapy. This implies a general understanding that this type of therapy cannot use RCT 
methods to support a case for its increasing availability.   
 
Understanding how therapy works 
This theme also corresponds to expert concerns that the complexity of psychotherapy 
processes are ignored or even warped by RCT methods. However, this theme reflects sense 
making which is partially ignorant of psychotherapy research jargon about process versus 
outcome. It represents instead an intuitive sense of what matters in a therapeutic relationship 
that cannot be captured in an RCT. 
 
Understanding the way in which therapy might work or not work seemed to be of more 
relevance to participants than aggregated group outcomes.  There was a fairly consistent view 
that for the client group in the trial, short-term therapies were unlikely to lead to real 
recovery, largely because of the connection to deep seated trauma discussed above. This was 
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coupled for some with a sense that short-term therapies were often all that was on offer and 
could not be refused: 
 
I will engage because it makes it looks like I'm engaging with my ill health, which is a 
positive, so I'm engaging but not actually fully engaging because it's six weeks which 
is never gonna get to the real of this thing that I've been burdened with for as long as I 
can remember… so I'll tick that box because it shows that I've done it and I'm really 
trying. (PPC) 
  
Part of the reason short-term therapies were seen as unlikely to work was to do with the 
relationship with the therapist being key to the process. Trust was seen as intrinsic and 
something which required gelling with the right therapist and time: 
 
it goes hand in hand with trust… I very, very openly, when I first went into any sort of 
therapy, have said very sceptical and I don't trust you and until I can trust you I can't 
talk to you about the things that I don't even know are there, that I do know are there, 
but I don't know what they are because they're so suppressed… and until I trust you I 
can't do that. (PPC) 
 
Psychoanalytic psychotherapy was described as a ‘deeper form of treatment’ and was thought 
to provide longer term learning and skills than other treatments, enabling you to ‘know 
yourself’, ‘empowering you to move forward’, make ‘longer lasting changes’ which can carry 
on ‘for the rest of your life’.  
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Some of these ideas invoked a sense of mystery around the process which was openly 
acknowledged by some, and thus the presentation by the therapist was described as very 
illuminating, an unmasking of the process:  
 
I’ve never heard a therapist talk in that way… I thought it was a kind of closed shop 
really and that they had these methods and these things that they were never going to 
disclose to the great unwashed, so to have her be so upfront and honest it was 
extraordinary and I thought, yes, very brave, especially when she was saying that she 
felt ashamed that I didn’t do a bit better and I was very surprised to hear that, so that 
in itself kind of overturned my idea of therapy and therapists. (PPC) 
 
What seemed to be illuminated was the key role of the relationship in the therapy, 
emphasising the points above. This was also related to the view that improvements in 
relationships are the most important outcomes of therapy; that outcomes should be more 
subjective and that functioning outcomes are critical. These ideas were largely antithetical to 
the focus on symptom outcomes as presented in the study findings. In commenting on one of 
the service user presentations, a participant noted: 
 
…the importance for her was in the improvement in relationships and for a lot of 
people that’s what they want, … that’s the end goal to get to that point where they can 
have that confidence and have that kind of that, that better existence because they are 
able to relate to people across the board… she was saying to be able to have 
relationship with another person, but to have the relationship with the therapist, sort of 
the family and the whole works. (PPC) 
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Because of the importance of the relationship and that at the end of therapy, the relationship 
with the therapist must come to an end, it was felt that the therapist and GP need to work 
together and that ending therapy needs transitional support, emphasising the perceived 
relational context of therapy within the wider support system.  
 
Selecting a therapy is complex 
NICE guidelines compare treatments and formulate a hierarchy, with ‘first-line’ 
recommendations for treatments being those with the greatest weight of RCT evidence. The 
within-paradigm critique of this is ‘the Dodo Bird Verdict’ that all psychotherapies may be 
equally effective (e.g. Wampold, 1997) and that individual therapist effects are more 
significant that therapy modality effects. Discussions in the focus groups about how to select 
a therapy seemed to be based neither on the equivalence nor the hierarchical position, rather 
the arguments illustrated in this theme about choosing a therapy come from without the 
EBMH paradigm and speak to participants’ experiential notions of how to choose a therapy. 
 
There was a view that several factors will influence the outcome of therapy including 
intelligence of the therapist, trust in the therapist, client variables such as social support, 
gender, sexuality, lifestyle, motivation, commitment, expectations. Relatedly, it was felt that 
therapy should be tailored not manualised: “a good therapist, there is no set rules”; which is 
antithetical to testing manualised interventions as required by RCT quality standards. It was 
also felt that therapy duration should depend on individual need, further problematising the 
concept of RCTs which require identical length treatments for comparability. This idea of 
individualised interventions came across in both the PPC and professional groups: 
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It may be that… very intensive therapy for perhaps slightly shorter times, with more 
of a guarantee that people would go for a longer period of time into groups as they 
transition out of it, it might be… an economically sensible model. (Professional) 
 
Some people will come with come with lots of… deep rooted issues and some won't, 
so it’s got to be accordingly. (PPC) 
 
The multiplicity of ‘best’ treatments was also conveyed in the idea that you have to find 
what’s best for you: 
 
For some people that might be enough, or they might need it with something else, 
pills or CBT or whatever it is, but… I think for everyone I think it’s finding what 
works for you. (PPC) 
 
There was a sense that the right therapy for an individual should not be based on profiling or 
a formal diagnosis which was depicted as a frustrating aspect of accessing NHS treatments. 
 
They keep pushing me back into a template… I said please can you listen to what I'm 
saying, I don't fit into that profile, can you try to offer me kind of alternative 
therapy… so at the moment they're not really listening to me at the moment. (PPC) 
 
This concept of individual needs and individual problems related to an implicit notion of 
patient choice. There was a premise that the client should have a role in deciding which 
therapy they need and that hearing other's experiences of therapy is important for one’s own 
choice. For this reason the service user talks were felt to be valuable, with the proviso that 
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people would have liked to have heard more about what didn’t work and why things might 
work and not work for different people. However, active patient choice was felt to be 
unsupported by medical professionals: 
 
In terms of offering the various options to service users… sometimes the information 
is not being given to the service user in order for them to make an informed decision, 
as soon as they say they want to go the holistic way, straight away the alarm bells start 
triggering with the medical profession for whatever reason, and then you get ..shunted 
into a different sort of arena where they label you as a kind of problem maker. (PPC) 
 
There was a view that choosing a therapy was secondary to overcoming stigma which can 
prevent people even discussing their problems and subsequently their treatment options with 
professionals: 
 
Psychotherapy or talking therapies of any form, are not something people will be 
familiar with… or, if they are familiar with they will also be quite reluctant to take it 
on… stigma anyway… attached to mental health… so I think maybe health 
professionals need to be aware of that… as well and try to encourage people. (PPC) 
 
This emphasises that RCTs in mental health have limited relevance to the larger population of 
potential beneficiaries who are battling stigma or suffering in silence rather than worrying 
about which intervention might help them. 
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Inevitability of cost effectiveness 
Formal cost effectiveness analyses often only compare outcomes with participants’ health 
costs up to one year preceding the intervention; a technical within-paradigm critique might 
emphasise this limitation with chronically ill populations. However, participants were in a 
sense ‘ignorant’ of this and as illustrated in this theme, were speaking about an intuitive sense 
of value in two senses: one that costs shouldn’t matter and two, that because of the extent and 
duration of the difficulties which placed burdens throughout the health and care system as 
well as families and friends for many years, anything that helped would inevitably save costs 
when considering everything holistically. 
 
Although no findings relating to cost effectiveness of the intervention were presented, there 
were views expressed which implied that cost effectiveness seemed inevitable. This view 
appeared to be based on factors that are unlikely to feature in a formal cost effectiveness 
analysis and hinged on an intuitively holistic sense of the broader value of the therapy.  This 
was sometimes expressed as de facto common sense in that “costs shouldn’t come into it… 
cause if something works yeah it will then help in the long term”. This seemed to need no 
further explanation, although others did elaborate on this, for example: 
 
They are really depressed for a very long time, so that’s an awful lot of kind of GP 
and man hours and so on, which is what at the end of the day the system and the 
commissioner and so on are looking for, but also… benefiting those people and you 
can’t put a cost on that. (PPC) 
 
I think it is worth funding, because the amount of energy and time that is spent by me, 
very interestingly the most intractable patient also complains of memory problems 
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which… has ended up with referral so very cleverly shops around and asks the GPs to 
get new referrals and now he’s under the wing of some… professor … I think it’s all a 
part of the same story and the number of scans… I can’t tell you, what I think 
actually, it is a, I mean, my instinct is it’s a worthwhile investment. (Professional) 
 
There was a sense that those responsible for making financial decisions about treatment were 
not driven by the right sort of considerations: 
 
I don't know how the government or people who are funding it, will interpret that, 
because they want quick numbers, they want to literally immediate statistics, so they 
just think well two years down the line… we've got other people who need… bypass 
surgery, now we want quick results, so I don't know how they see that as actually is 
that money worth spending. (PPC) 
 
There was acknowledgement that this type of therapy would be more expensive than shorter 
therapies; yet there was a clear sense that thinking about patients as burdensome was not just 
a short-term narrow way of thinking about costs but also out of keeping with efforts to 
destigmatise mental illness:  
 
The GP has the audacity to say to the patient that you are an expensive patient he 
cannot keep on coming and seeing me, right so, this unfortunate this stigma is really, 
really extreme and in some sort of parity with mental health and physical health, it 
doesn’t really exist… I think there is still a long way to go. (PPC) 
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Discussion 
McGoey (2010) described technical critiques of EBMH using within-paradigm arguments as 
a form of strategic ignorance which has served to bolster the paradigm. The very undertaking 
of an RCT of psychoanalytic psychotherapy also falls into the trap of strategic ignorance, as 
arguably do all psychotherapy RCTs.  The lay critiques of RCTs in the empirical data 
presented each have analogous forms in the expert domain, from where experts have 
attempted to debunk RCTs using a plethora of arguments. The data suggest that people who 
are not expert psychotherapy researchers place much less value on RCTs in this field than 
NICE. The undermining of RCTs in the data, while congruent with expert critiques, also has 
some nuance attributable in part to its origin in experience rather than methodological 
expertise. The way in which participants made sense of this RCT, critiquing both its premise 
and usefulness from outside of the paradigm, points towards the potential for a different 
paradigm.  
 
The RCT findings seem to have been made sense of with an intuitive sense of the value of the 
treatment irrespective of the findings of the RCT. This intuition applied to the clinical and 
cost value and derived from a sense of the importance of a relationship based treatment and 
its likely impact on people who have deep seated traumas contributing to their long-standing 
misery.  This way of making sense of the client group and the treatment rendered almost 
irrelevant the details of the carefully prescribed RCT methodology and have been referred to 
here as ‘non-strategic ignorance’, since it does not attempt to employ the rules of EBMH in a 
strategic way to critique specific examples of within-paradigm evidence. We now consider, 
using Kuhn’s thesis on scientific revolutions (1962), whether the conditions might be present 
for a shift towards a paradigm in which service user views are central, rather than a 
paradigmatic problem to be solved. 
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Kuhn argued that ‘normal science’ operates within a fairly rigid framework which aims to 
protect the paradigm from disconfirmation.  Psychoanalytic psychotherapy is the antithesis of 
EBMH, partly because its adherents held most political sway among the psychiatric 
profession in North America immediately prior to the paradigm shift from ‘clinical inference’ 
to EBMH from the 1950s onwards. An RCT of psychoanalytic psychotherapy is problematic 
for EBMH because it brings a practice associated with clinical inference into the category of 
‘evidence based’. Such a contra-indication has contributed to the NICE (2017) draft update to 
the depression guideline (the final version still postponed at the time of writing) designing its 
review methodology in a way that means the RCT concerned is deemed not to provide good 
evidence of efficacy, contrary to the actual findings.   RCTs clearly remain “normal science” 
for now. 
 
Yet the notion of ‘scientific revolutions’ contains the premise that paradigms will come and 
go. Kuhn (1962) defined a paradigm as a mode of thinking that is "sufficiently unprecedented 
to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity," 
and "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of 
practitioners to resolve." A new paradigm attracts enough adherents away from the prevailing 
paradigm to create a shift in the political power attributed to respective groups of adherents. 
We might think of EBMH as having been a new paradigm in its time that, from the 1950s 
onwards, drew away adherents of ‘clinical inference’ and psychoanalysis towards modernist 
principles. But EBMH has not resolved the problems inherent within it. Might a shift occur 
again?  
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One of the key problems unresolved within EBMH is Patient and Public Involvement (PPI). 
PPI refers to the principle, now dominant in UK health policy, that patients and the public 
should have a direct role in all levels of healthcare planning, delivery and research, offering 
the potential for ‘increased democratic accountability’ (Madden & Speed, 2017). The idea 
that service users might have valuable insights to contribute to this level of planning and 
delivery is also linked to increasing recognition that service user experience (in the form of 
qualitative research) has value. In a similar vein is the idea of shared decision making in 
clinical practice in which clinicians and patients share information and come to joint 
decisions about treatment (Charles, Gafni & Whelan, 1997). 
 
Early in the emergence of EBMH as a new paradigm, Faulkner and Thomas (2002) set out a 
vision for EBMH which included more patient-centred forms of evidence. They set out ethics 
and morality as the primary arguments for including user-led qualitative research on patient 
experience as essential to the repertoire of EBMH.  Within EBMH and specifically NICE, 
commissioning and health policy making generally, PPI has been widely endorsed and 
encouraged. Yet, as noted by Madden and Speed (2017), PPI has largely become an empty 
signifier, “a ghastly composite of a zombie policy that continually pops up, offering (but 
never providing) a solution to purported deficits in democratic engagement.”  PPI has 
therefore been a particular thorn in the side of EBMH because it is messy and subjective and 
threatens the purified dichotomy of nature and culture in Latour’s terms. As Madden and 
Speed (2017) note, PPI tends to be no more than “an opportunity for professionals to 
consume affective individual testimony without the need to engage with wider publics or 
more contextualised forms of research”. 
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Kuhn notes that there must be a crisis in the current paradigm to create the conditions for a 
paradigm shift.  ‘Complexity’ is a necessary aspect of a crisis in that the ongoing adjustment 
of the theory creates an ever-increasing complex theory that cannot sustain itself.  To 
conclude, we return to ‘new EBM’ to see where this complexity may lie. The ‘new EBM’ 
described by Wieringa et al (2017) suggests an ever-increasing complexity with their 
acknowledgement that there is no resolution to the nature-culture messiness: 
[EBM] can never fully embrace this middle kingdom without effectively rejecting the 
very concept of evidence on which its central claims are based. Instead of resolving 
this paradox, the [EBM] movement must coexist with it and ‘muddle through’. 
 
This acknowledges that ‘new EBM’ is now unfathomably messy and illogical and yet there is 
a wish for it to prevail. "Though they may begin to lose faith and then to consider 
alternatives, they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis."  (Kuhn, 1962). 
The data presented in the current paper provides inklings that an alternative paradigm may 
already be (or always has been) available outside of the EBMH expert community, outside of 
positions of power, policy and commissioning. This alternative could potentially coagulate 
around Madden and Speed’s call for a more democratic and less technocratic approach to PPI 
in which populations are ‘critically involved’ and engaged in decision making. This would 
mean not a ‘new EBM’ but something epistemologically different, representing a different 
form of nature-culture with service users in a central, not peripheral role, and which could of 
course be studied comparatively to the current nature-culture formation that is EBMH. 
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest. 
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